Updating Microsoft Secure Boot keys before expiration in June 2026



UPDATE 4/02:

UPDATE 2/10:


 Windows IT Pro Blog:

Secure Boot playbook for certificates expiring in 2026

The first set of tools and steps are now available to help you proactively update your Secure Boot certificates before they expire in June of 2026.

Secure Boot is more mature and robust today than it was some years ago. Coupled with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware signing process, Secure Boot uses cryptographic keys, known as certificate authorities (CAs), to validate that firmware modules come from a trusted source. This helps prevent malware from running early in the startup sequence of a Windows device.

Secure Boot certificates have always had expiration dates. New certificates help ensure that your devices stay up to date with the latest security protections. That is why your organization will need to install the 2023 CAs before the 2011 CAs start expiring in June of 2026.

Note: Need a refresher on why updating Secure Boot certificates is so important?
Many Windows PCs manufactured since 2024 already have the updated 2023 certificates. For the remaining devices, Microsoft is delivering new Secure Boot certificates through Windows monthly updates, with partner original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) making firmware updates available to help ensure compatibility.

If you wish to proactively update your Secure Boot certificates, this post contains initial steps you can take and tools you can use, with more scalable approaches coming soon. At a minimum, we encourage you to monitor the progress of your device fleet from the start.

Let’s get started. Here’s a summary of what you can do today to prepare:
  • Step 1: Inventory and prepare your environment
  • Step 2: Monitor and check your devices for Secure Boot status
  • Step 3: Apply OEM firmware updates before Microsoft updates
  • Step 4: Plan and pilot Secure Boot certificate deployments
  • Step 5: Troubleshoot and remediate common issues

Step 1: Inventory and prepare your environment​

For most devices in your organization, Microsoft will automatically update high-confidence devices via Windows Update. However, you can validate and actively roll out these updates, in which case, you would start by conducting an inventory.

Inventory

Most devices manufactured since 2012 have Secure Boot enabled, but you should always verify that. You should also check the status of the Secure Boot certificates with sample inventory PowerShell commands or by checking the value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key (it should ultimately be “updated”). Out of the devices that show up as not updated, build a small, representative sample. We recommend that you focus on the less common devices, for which high confidence determination isn’t automatic. Then follow the rest of the steps outlined in this post to pilot the certificate updates and help ensure that deployment is successful

Prepare select devices

To prepare devices for Secure Boot certificate deployment, consider how you’ll manage it. There are several approaches to managing Secure Boot certificate updates. Today, you can use registry keys or Group Policy. A Configuration Service Provider (CSP) for mobile device management (MDM), such as Microsoft Intune, is coming soon. Bookmark Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates - Microsoft Support for the latest updates.
  1. The primary method is to deploy the certificates to devices that have been validated as ready for the update. See Step 4 when you’re ready to deploy these updates!
  2. For the more common device configurations in your environment, you can utilize two “assists” to manage your deployment:
    • Get new certificates through monthly Windows updates for high-confidence devices. This option is enabled by default for devices that are ready for new certificates. Microsoft will update these devices for you unless you opt out. To opt out, set the HighConfidenceOptOut registry key<a href="Secure Boot playbook for certificates expiring in 2026 - Windows IT Pro Blog" target="_self" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer">ii</a> value to 1 or set the Automatic Certificate Deployment via Updates Group Policy to Disabled.
    • Opt devices in to Microsoft-managed controlled feature rollout. With registry keys, set the value of MicrosoftUpdateManagedOptIn to 1 to opt in to Microsoft-managed controlled feature rollout. The value of 0 or non-existent key means that you’re opted out. With Group Policy, configure the Certificate Deployment via Controlled Feature Rollout policy to Enabled. Note: To opt in, please configure devices to share required diagnostic data with Microsoft.
Important: All Secure Boot registry keys are under these two paths:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\Servicing


See Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates for more details.

Group Policy settings are available to you under the following path: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Secure Boot. To get the updates that include the Group Policy for deploying Secure Boot certificate updates, download the latest Administrative Templates (.admx) for Windows 11 and Windows Server.

Step 2: Monitor and check your devices for Secure Boot status​

Check the Secure Boot status of your devices before and after deployment. Soon, you will be able to use your preferred management and reporting tools. For now, you can use registry keys or Windows Event Log events to identify which devices already have new certificates and which ones need attention.

Deployment progress

The text value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key will indicate if your certificate deployment status is not started, in progress, or updated. The value will change progressively until all new certificates and the new boot manager have been deployed successfully.

Successful deployment
  • Audit the Windows System Event Log events for Event ID 1808. This informational event indicates that the device has the required new Secure Boot certificates applied to the device’s firmware.
  • Audit the UEFICA2023Error registry key for issues. This key should not exist unless an error is pending.
  • Check that the text value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key reads as “Updated.”
Errors during deployment
  • Audit the Windows System Event Log for Event ID 1801.This error event indicates that the updated certificates have not been applied to the device. Analyze details specific to the device, including device attributes, that will help you in correlating which devices still need updating.
  • Check if the UEFICA2023Error registry key exists. If so, it indicates an error in certificate deployment. The error itself won’t appear in the Event Log. Trace related issues through Secure Boot DB and DBX variable update events.

Step 3: Apply OEM firmware updates before Microsoft updates​

Updated firmware can help prevent compatibility problems and ensure new Secure Boot certificates are accepted. If your organization has identified Secure Boot update issues or your OEM recommends a firmware update, apply the latest BIOS/UEFI update before installing Secure Boot–related Windows updates.

Some OEMs provide firmware updates that include important fixes and updated certificate stores. These updates help Secure Boot function correctly with new Windows certificates. Microsoft works closely with OEM partners to ensure these updates integrate smoothly with Windows.

Step 4: Plan and pilot Secure Boot certificate deployments​

As you’ve seen in Step 1, Microsoft can assist with your Secure Boot updates if you enable diagnostic data.

You can also deploy new Secure Boot certificates yourself for devices that don’t already have them. Choose a way to do this with registry keys, via Windows Configuration System (WinCS) command-line interface (CLI), or using Group Policy today. Pilot your desired method first on a representative set of devices to gain confidence.

In a typical enterprise deployment, whatever option you choose, allow approximately 48 hours and one or more restarts after changing configuration for updates to fully apply. See How updates are deployed for more details. For testing scenarios, you can accelerate the experience by following the steps outlined in Device Testing Using Registry Keys.

Important: Avoid mixing deployment methods on the same device. For additional technical recommendations to help you plan and deploy your Secure Boot updates, see Deployment strategies.

Option 1: Deploy certificates with registry keys​

Find the AvailableUpdates registry key located under this registry path:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot

Set its value to 0x5944 to deploy all needed certificates and update to the Windows UEFI CA 2023 signed boot manager. This key corresponds to the Group Policy setting Enable Secure Boot certificate deployment. For details, see Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates.

Option 2: Deploy certificates via Windows Configuration System (WinCS)​

New command-line tools are now available for domain-joined clients on Windows 11, versions 25H2, 24H2, and 23H2.

These include both a traditional executable and a PowerShell module to query and apply Secure Boot configurations locally to a device. For step-by-step guidance, see Windows Configuration System (WinCS) APIs for Secure Boot.

Deploy the Secure Boot updates via WinCS:
  • Feature name: Feature_AllKeysAndBootMgrByWinCS
  • WinCS key value: F33E0C8E002
  • Secure Boot configuration state: Enabled

Option 3: Deploy certificates using Group Policy​

Group Policy settings are available by navigating to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Secure Boot.

To apply Secure Boot updates to devices using Group Policy, set the Enable Secure Boot certificate deployment policy to Enabled. This lets Windows automatically begin the certificate deployment process. This setting corresponds to the registry key AvailableUpdates.

Be sure to get the latest version of the .admx for Windows 11 and Windows Server. For more details, see Group Policy Objects (GPO) method of Secure Boot for Windows devices with IT-managed updates.

Option 4: Deploy certificates using mobile device management (coming soon)​

Soon, you’ll be able to manage Secure Boot updates using MDM solutions, such as Microsoft Intune. When this method is available, we will post updated guidance at Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates - Microsoft Support.

Step 5. Troubleshoot and remediate common issues​

You can also use registry keys and Windows Event Log events to identify and resolve common issues:
  • The UEFICA2023Error registry key doesn’t exist if there are no errors. If it exists with a value other than 0, check your remediation recommendations in Secure Boot DB and DBX variable update events.
  • The AvailableUpdates registry key on a device is set to 0x4104. If it doesn’t clear the 0x0004 bit even after multiple restarts, the device doesn’t progress past deploying the new Key Exchange Key (KEK) certificate. If you encounter this error, check with your OEM to confirm they have followed the steps outlined in Windows Secure Boot Key Creation and Management Guidance.
  • If Event Viewer Windows Logs for System registers an Event ID 1795, it means that there was an error when Windows attempted to hand off the certificates to firmware. Check with the OEM to see if there is a firmware update available for the device to resolve this issue.

Your update strategy begins today​

Today, you can start preparing, monitoring, deploying, and troubleshooting Secure Boot certificates in advance of the June 2026 expiration date. The new registry keys, WinCS, Group Policy, and Windows Log tools are here to support you and are just the beginning. More tools for additional scenarios are in development.

For the latest information, bookmark Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates. Looking for a specific topic?

 Source:





 Windows IT Pro Blog:

Updating Microsoft Secure Boot keys​

Microsoft, in collaboration with our ecosystem partners, is preparing to roll out replacement certificates that’ll set new Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Certificate Authorities (CAs) trust anchors in Secure Boot for the future. Look out for Secure Boot database updates rolling out in phases to add trust for the new database (DB) and Key Exchange Key (KEK) certificates. This new DB update is available as an optional servicing update for all Secure Boot enabled devices from February 13, 2024.

What is Secure Boot?​

Secure Boot is a security feature in the UEFI that helps ensure that only trusted software runs during the system’s boot sequence. It works by verifying the digital signature of any software against a set of trusted digital keys stored in the UEFI. As an industry standard, UEFI’s Secure Boot defines how platform firmware manages certificates, authenticates firmware, and how the operating system (OS) interfaces with this process. For more details on UEFI and Secure Boot, please refer to this article.

Secure Boot was first introduced to Windows systems with the Windows 8 release to protect against the emerging pre-boot malware (bootkit) threat at that time. Since then, Secure Boot has continued to be a part of Microsoft's Trusted Boot security architecture. Secure Boot authenticates modules such as UEFI firmware drivers, bootloaders, applications, and option ROMs (Read-Only Memory), which are firmware run by the PC BIOS during platform initialization, before they are all executed. As the final step of the Secure Boot process, the firmware verifies the Windows boot loader is trusted by Secure Boot and then passes control to the boot loader which in turn verifies, loads into memory, and launches Windows. This process coupled with the UEFI firmware signing process helps to ensure that only verified code executes before Windows, preventing attackers from utilizing the boot path as an attack vector. To learn more about how Secure Boot fits in with the overall Windows chip-t-cloud security, please refer to the Windows Security Book RWMyFE.

Trust and authenticity in Secure Boot are built using the Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). This establishes a certificate management system which utilizes CAs to store digital certificates. These CAs, consisting of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or their delegates and Microsoft, generate key pairs that form the root of trust of a system.

bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA0OWlGOEI2MDY4MzMyRDJDNzBC


Secure Boot “root of trust”: Setting trust anchors for the future​

Secure Boot’s root of trust utilizes a hierarchical system, where the Platform Key (PK) is typically managed by the OEM and used to sign updates to the KEK database. The KEK in turn signs updates to both the Allowed Signature DB and the Forbidden Signature Database (DBX).

The Secure Boot Allowed Signature DB and the DBX are integral to the functionality of Secure Boot. Bootloader modules’ signing authority must be allowlisted by the Secure Boot DB, while the DBX is used for revoking previously trusted boot components. Updates to the DB and DBX must be signed by a KEK in the Secure Boot KEK database.

The configuration of Secure Boot DB and KEK for Windows devices has remained the same since Windows 8. Microsoft requires every OEM to include the same three certificates managed by Microsoft for Windows and in support of the third-party hardware and OS ecosystem. These include the Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 stored in the KEK database, and two certificates stored in the DB called the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, which signs the Windows bootloader, and the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (or third-party UEFI CA), which signs third-party OS and hardware driver components.

All three of these Microsoft certificates expire in 2026. So, in collaboration with our ecosystem partners, Microsoft is preparing to roll out replacement certificates that will set new UEFI CA trust anchors for the future. Microsoft will be rolling out Secure Boot database updates in phases to add trust for the new DB and KEK certificates. The first DB update will add the Microsoft Windows UEFI CA 2023 to the system DB. The new Microsoft Windows UEFI CA 2023 will be used to sign Windows boot components prior to the expiration of the Windows Production CA 2011. This DB update will be optional for the February 2024 servicing and preview updates, and can be manually applied to devices. Microsoft will slowly roll out this DB update as we validate devices and firmware compatibility globally. The full DB update’s controlled-rollout process to all Windows customers will begin during the 2024 April servicing and preview updates, ahead of the certificate expiration in 2026. Meanwhile, efforts to update the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (aka third-party UEFI CA) and Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 will begin late 2024, and will follow a similar controlled rollout process as this DB update.

While Microsoft has frequently performed DBX updates globally since the inception of Secure Boot, this will be the first DB update performed on such a large scale. We’re actively collaborating with our OEM partners to identify and address bugs in firmware implementation that could result in unbootable systems or render a device unreceptive to the DB update. To ensure a successful rollout, devices with identified issues will be suspended from receiving the update until a fix is released.

Microsoft is taking a very deliberate and cautious approach to rolling out this update. With this DB update, Microsoft will sustain its ability to service all Windows devices’ boot components.

Guidance to manually apply DB update​

The DB update is available on February 13, 2024, along with manual steps to allow customers to test for firmware compatibility, especially for organizations with fleets of devices. If you would like to manually apply the DB update to validate that your system is compatible, please read the following instructions. These actions should be completed with non-critical hardware representing devices in your environment.

Pre-requisite checks​

Before attempting the DB update, please ensure to perform the necessary pre-requisite checks:
  1. If you intend to manually apply this update to a large group of devices, we advise that you begin by rolling out to individual devices with the same firmware and specifications first to minimize the risks in the case of firmware bugs in your devices.
  2. Please verify that your UEFI firmware version is the most recent available version by your firmware vendor or OEM.
  3. For data backup steps, please refer to this guide.
  4. If you use BitLocker or if your enterprise has deployed BitLocker on your machine, ensure to backup BitLocker Keys:


    A) See this portal to ensure your BitLocker keys are backed up before your next reboot for your selfhost device. In the unlikely event that device becomes inoperable after receiving the update, the hard drive can still be unlocked.

    B) If the keys are backed up, the UI should resemble the following:

    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1MGk5NzY0QzRENjdBQkYwRkE2


    C) If the keys are not backed up, please open Windows Search to search for “Manage BitLocker” and select Back up your recovery key followed by Save to your Azure AD or MSA account.

    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1MWlEQkZDQTZDNDBDOEQwNzMy


    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1Mmk5QjE2MDRBRTAyMUE1MDQ5


    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1M2k2MzgxMUE1NEQ5NjEzREE4
For users that use a local account instead of an Azure Active Directory (AAD) or Microsoft account (MSA), you can print your recovery password, save to a file, and store it in a secure location.


 Formal DB update steps

  1. Apply the February 2024 (or later) security update.
  2. Open a PowerShell console and ensure that PowerShell is running as an administrator before running the following commands:
    1. Set the registry key to:

      Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot" -Name "AvailableUpdates" -Value 0x40
    2. Run the following scheduled task as:

      Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName "\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update"
  3. Reboot the machine twice after running these commands to confirm that the machine is booting with the updated DB.
  4. To verify that the Secure Boot DB update was successful, open a PowerShell console and ensure that PowerShell is running as an administrator before running the following command:

    [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI db).bytes) -match ‘Windows UEFI CA 2023’

    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1NGlGNjJBRDlDRTNCRDJCQTIw
If the command returns “True”, the update was successful. In the case of errors while applying the DB update, please refer to the article, KB5016061: Addressing vulnerable and revoked Boot Managers.


 Source:


See also:
 
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Either the SkuSiPolicy.p7b is different (which I doubt because the script would report something), or the policy is enforcing other sub-policies which are located on the EFI partition.

Code:
> mountvol S: /s

> dir S:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\CIPolicies\Active

04/01/2024  12:22 AM            10,564 {5DAC656C-21AD-4A02-AB49-649917162E70}.cip
12/06/2025  06:27 PM            32,508 {82443e1e-8a39-4b4a-96a8-f40ddc00b9f3}.cip
04/01/2024  12:22 AM            10,972 {CDD5CB55-DB68-4D71-AA38-3DF2B6473A52}.cip

You can try checking the other PC's, and see if these files are different. The Secure Boot update process doesn't touch these files, but they're part of the enforcement for policy files.

Here is what I get on the Dell XPS 8940.

1777627800676.webp

This below is a multiboot.
1777626428293.webp
 
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My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Dell XPS 8930
    CPU
    Intel I9-9900K
    Memory
    64GB
    Graphics Card(s)
    NVIDIA RTX 2060
    Sound Card
    NVIDIA High Definition Audio
    Monitor(s) Displays
    4k Samsung
    Screen Resolution
    3840 x 2160
    Hard Drives
    512GB NVMe, ADATA SU 800, 2TB HDD
{8f9cb695-5d48-48d6-a329-7202b44607e3}.CIP is an enforcement policy.

You can try deleting it from the EFI. Another copy exists in C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\CIPolicies.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
It depends on the exact wording of the TPM-WMI messages. Assuming your PC was updated right before April, the April 2026 Monthly Update should have bumped your SVN from 7.0 to 8.0. This would count as another updated key.
[/CODE]

It is a 1808 TPM-WMI event with this exact wording:
"This device has updated Secure Boot CA/keys. This device signature information is included here.
(long list of device info here)
BucketId: 252fdf73562bcb39e8edd85848e385d65eeea01d7e1c9792bd59e98ee458a650
BucketConfidenceLevel: High Confidence
UpdateType: Windows UEFI CA 2023 (DB), Option ROM CA 2023 (DB), 3P UEFI CA 2023 (DB), KEK 2023, Boot Manager (2023)
For more information, please see Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates - Microsoft Support."

And it is starting to look like this event occurs shortly after a reboot, have three of these events in the event log now. It would be nice if Microsoft just gave some documentation on the matter, like is this event appearing several times normal, or is it a problem. Anyone else here seeing multiple 1808 events in their event logs, after rebooting of course, it doesn't seem to do anything if you don't reboot?
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Home
Run this command. Is the value set to 0? (nothing to do)
Code:
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Secureboot" /v AvailableUpdates

The Secure Boot task will sometimes delay actions until the next round of reboots, so it can guarantee the changes got properly applied.

MS is trying to be paranoid. In my script, I just apply all the changes at the same time (but with the proper safety checks). My method ends up only needing one reboot for everything to take effect. Their method may take multiple reboots, since they're auditing the results. Same results, but more waiting...
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
{8f9cb695-5d48-48d6-a329-7202b44607e3}.CIP is an enforcement policy.

You can try deleting it from the EFI. Another copy exists in C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\CIPolicies.
I think I found a temporary workaround by renaming the SkuSiPolicy.p7b in the EFI partition as MSSkuSiPolicy.p7b.Bad and booting once by disabling the Secure Boot and then again after reenabling the secure boot.
I tried this on a Dell XPS 8940 that is a multiboot with 3 systems (R..P., Dev, Canary).
Had to remove the PIN and add it back after iit booted correctly on all 3 systems.
I can now boot the USB with 29576.1000 and also can boot WinRE on the 28020.1873 that was failing when it had the SkuSiPolicy.p7b.
Here is the current status, I'll leave it like that till MS gets a fix for their mess. 🤬
1777661397230.webp

1777661449928.webp
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Dell XPS 8930
    CPU
    Intel I9-9900K
    Memory
    64GB
    Graphics Card(s)
    NVIDIA RTX 2060
    Sound Card
    NVIDIA High Definition Audio
    Monitor(s) Displays
    4k Samsung
    Screen Resolution
    3840 x 2160
    Hard Drives
    512GB NVMe, ADATA SU 800, 2TB HDD
Had to remove the PIN and add it back after iit booted correctly on all 3 systems.
If you're using BitLocker or Windows Hello, typically you should disable them before making SkuSiPolicy changes. The TPM can detect certain security changes outside of it, and invalidate the cached credentials. So it's always better to disable BitLocker and Windows Hello out of caution.

I can now boot the USB with 29576.1000 and also can boot WinRE on the 28020.1873 that was failing when it had the SkuSiPolicy.p7b.
Here is the current status, I'll leave it like that till MS gets a fix for their mess. 🤬
Like I said, SkuSiPolicy tends to be opaque. You can reverse-extract some of policy rules, but there isn't an auditing tool which compares a live system, or boot image by reading every single file in it. Some policies can be run in audit mode, where can gather event log data on what files are non-compliant.

But unless you're an enterprise IT admin, no one really does that extra work to find out.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
If you're using BitLocker or Windows Hello, typically you should disable them before making SkuSiPolicy changes. The TPM can detect certain security changes outside of it, and invalidate the cached credentials. So it's always better to disable BitLocker and Windows Hello out of caution.


Like I said, SkuSiPolicy tends to be opaque. You can reverse-extract some of policy rules, but there isn't an auditing tool which compares a live system, or boot image by reading every single file in it. Some policies can be run in audit mode, where can gather event log data on what files are non-compliant.

But unless you're an enterprise IT admin, no one really does that extra work to find out.
1) I never use BitLocker.
2) As for the policy SkuSiPolicy.p7b it is definitely bad and causes the problem on Build 28020.1873 WinRE booting.
Also fails any boot of 295xx.1000 including the official MS ISO used to create the USB installation media 29576.1000.
Microsoft needs to fix or disable that bad policy for OEM machines.
 
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My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Dell XPS 8930
    CPU
    Intel I9-9900K
    Memory
    64GB
    Graphics Card(s)
    NVIDIA RTX 2060
    Sound Card
    NVIDIA High Definition Audio
    Monitor(s) Displays
    4k Samsung
    Screen Resolution
    3840 x 2160
    Hard Drives
    512GB NVMe, ADATA SU 800, 2TB HDD
Please run this command, when you're booted into each of the 28020 & 29576 systems:
Code:
> (Get-Item 'C:\Windows\System32\Boot\winload.efi').VersionInfo.ProductVersion
10.0.26100.8246

I like to know which versions of winload.efi are on the Insider builds.
 
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My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
Please run this command, when you're booted into each of the 28020 & 29576 systems:
Code:
> (Get-Item 'C:\Windows\System32\Boot\winload.efi').VersionInfo.ProductVersion
10.0.26100.8246

I like to know which versions of winload.efi are on the Insider builds.

Here for the 2 Builds with P.S. command.

Build 28020.1921:

(Get-Item 'C:\Windows\System32\Boot\winload.efi').VersionInfo.ProductVersion
10.0.28000.4

Build 29576.1000:

(Get-Item 'C:\Windows\System32\Boot\winload.efi').VersionInfo.ProductVersion
10.0.29576.1000
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Dell XPS 8930
    CPU
    Intel I9-9900K
    Memory
    64GB
    Graphics Card(s)
    NVIDIA RTX 2060
    Sound Card
    NVIDIA High Definition Audio
    Monitor(s) Displays
    4k Samsung
    Screen Resolution
    3840 x 2160
    Hard Drives
    512GB NVMe, ADATA SU 800, 2TB HDD
There you go. MS released a SkuSiPolicy file that doesn't cover their own Insider builds...

Code:
Policy File: "C:\Windows\System32\SecureBootUpdates\SkuSiPolicy.p7b" (3.0.0.14)

ID                   MinimumFileVersion MaximumFileVersion
--                   ------------------ ------------------
ID_ALLOW_A_0001      0.0.0.0
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0010 0.0.0.0            10.0.14393.9039
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000E 10.0.14400.0       10.0.17763.8619
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000D 10.0.18000.0       10.0.19041.7159
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0016 10.0.19100.0       10.0.20348.4999
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0017 10.0.20400.0       10.0.22621.6914
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000F 10.0.23000.0       10.0.25398.2259
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014 10.0.25400.0       10.0.26100.8220
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0013 10.0.26100.32000   10.0.26100.32649
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0012 10.0.26172.0       10.0.26172.32650
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015 10.0.27000.0       10.0.28000.1815  <-- 28000.4 winload.efi is BANNED
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011 10.0.29426.0       65535.65535.65535.65535  <-- 29576.1000 winload.efi is BANNED
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
There you go. MS released a SkuSiPolicy file that doesn't cover their own Insider builds...

Code:
Policy File: "C:\Windows\System32\SecureBootUpdates\SkuSiPolicy.p7b" (3.0.0.14)

ID                   MinimumFileVersion MaximumFileVersion
--                   ------------------ ------------------
ID_ALLOW_A_0001      0.0.0.0
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0010 0.0.0.0            10.0.14393.9039
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000E 10.0.14400.0       10.0.17763.8619
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000D 10.0.18000.0       10.0.19041.7159
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0016 10.0.19100.0       10.0.20348.4999
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0017 10.0.20400.0       10.0.22621.6914
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000F 10.0.23000.0       10.0.25398.2259
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014 10.0.25400.0       10.0.26100.8220
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0013 10.0.26100.32000   10.0.26100.32649
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0012 10.0.26172.0       10.0.26172.32650
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015 10.0.27000.0       10.0.28000.1815  <-- 28000.4 winload.efi is BANNED
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011 10.0.29426.0       65535.65535.65535.65535  <-- 29576.1000 winload.efi is BANNED
What a confusing mess! 😵‍💫🤷‍♂️
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Dell XPS 8930
    CPU
    Intel I9-9900K
    Memory
    64GB
    Graphics Card(s)
    NVIDIA RTX 2060
    Sound Card
    NVIDIA High Definition Audio
    Monitor(s) Displays
    4k Samsung
    Screen Resolution
    3840 x 2160
    Hard Drives
    512GB NVMe, ADATA SU 800, 2TB HDD
Maybe you Insider folks don't get to have nice things!

After downloading the 29576 & 28020 Insider ISO's, I extracted their winload.efi and SkuSiPolicy files for comparison. The short answer is if you're dual-booting Windows (especially with Insider builds), then don't use SkuSiPolicy!

I'm not on Insider, so I don't know how often Windows pushes a new winload.efi or SkuSiPolicy to the ring. As for WinRE, it might not be fully patched in your case. The only good thing is 29576 & 28020 share the same SkuSiPolicy file, so those two releases can dual-boot with each other.

Because every Windows image in a dual-boot might have a different patch level, you can't have an universal SkuSiPolicy. That would force everyone to constantly run updates, or lose their ability to dual boot.

Code:
> .\BlockedOrNot.ps1 C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi 26100.7623_winload.efi 28000.1761_winload.efi 28000.1830_winload.efi 280201.863_winload.efi 29576.1000_winload.efi
Policy File: "C:\Windows\System32\SecureBootUpdates\SkuSiPolicy.p7b" (3.0.0.14)

ID                   MinimumFileVersion MaximumFileVersion
--                   ------------------ ------------------
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0010 0.0.0.0            10.0.14393.9039
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000E 10.0.14400.0       10.0.17763.8619
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000D 10.0.18000.0       10.0.19041.7159
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0016 10.0.19100.0       10.0.20348.4999
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0017 10.0.20400.0       10.0.22621.6914
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000F 10.0.23000.0       10.0.25398.2259
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014 10.0.25400.0       10.0.26100.8220
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0013 10.0.26100.32000   10.0.26100.32649
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0012 10.0.26172.0       10.0.26172.32650
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015 10.0.27000.0       10.0.28000.1815
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011 10.0.29426.0       65535.65535.65535.65535

File: C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi (26100.8246)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\26100.7623_winload.efi (26100.7623) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014"
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28000.1761_winload.efi (28000.1761) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015"
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28000.1830_winload.efi (28000.1830)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\280201.863_winload.efi (28000.1863)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\29576.1000_winload.efi (29576.1000) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011"


> .\BlockedOrNot.ps1 C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi 26100.7623_winload.efi 28000.1761_winload.efi 28000.1830_winload.efi 280201.863_winload.efi 29576.1000_winload.efi -PolicyFile 28020_SkuSiPolicy.p7b
Policy File: "C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28020_SkuSiPolicy.p7b" (3.0.0.14)

ID                   MinimumFileVersion MaximumFileVersion
--                   ------------------ ------------------
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0010 0.0.0.0            10.0.14393.9039
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000E 10.0.14400.0       10.0.17763.8619
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000D 10.0.18000.0       10.0.19041.7159
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0016 10.0.19100.0       10.0.20348.4999
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0017 10.0.20400.0       10.0.22621.6914
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000F 10.0.23000.0       10.0.25398.2259
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014 10.0.25400.0       10.0.26100.8220
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0013 10.0.26100.32000   10.0.26100.32649
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0012 10.0.26172.0       10.0.26172.32650
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015 10.0.27000.0       10.0.28000.1815
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011 10.0.29426.0       65535.65535.65535.65535

File: C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi (26100.8246)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\26100.7623_winload.efi (26100.7623) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014"
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28000.1761_winload.efi (28000.1761) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015"
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28000.1830_winload.efi (28000.1830)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\280201.863_winload.efi (28000.1863)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\29576.1000_winload.efi (29576.1000) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011"

> .\BlockedOrNot.ps1 C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi 26100.7623_winload.efi 28000.1761_winload.efi 28000.1830_winload.efi 280201.863_winload.efi 29576.1000_winload.efi -PolicyFile 29531.1000_SkuSiPolicy.p7b
Policy File: "C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\29531.1000_SkuSiPolicy.p7b" (3.0.0.13)

ID                   MinimumFileVersion MaximumFileVersion
--                   ------------------ ------------------
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0010 0.0.0.0            10.0.14393.8769
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000E 10.0.14400.0       10.0.17763.8259
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000D 10.0.18000.0       10.0.19041.6799
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0016 10.0.19100.0       10.0.20348.6439
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0017 10.0.20400.0       10.0.22621.6479
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_000F 10.0.23000.0       10.0.25398.2079
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0014 10.0.25400.0       10.0.26100.7605
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0013 10.0.26100.32000   10.0.26100.32199
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0012 10.0.26172.0       10.0.26172.32200
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0015 10.0.27000.0       10.0.28000.1440
ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011 10.0.29426.0       65535.65535.65535.65535

File: C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi (26100.8246)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\26100.7623_winload.efi (26100.7623)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28000.1761_winload.efi (28000.1761)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\28000.1830_winload.efi (28000.1830)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\280201.863_winload.efi (28000.1863)
File: C:\Users\GARLIN\Downloads\29576.1000_winload.efi (29576.1000) - BLOCKED BY "ID_FILEATTRIB_F_0011"
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
To those of us who installed SkuSiPolicy as per the instructions of the earlier script recommendations. Is there a way to remove it?
 

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Me
    CPU
    Intel Core i5-12600K 3.7 GHz 10-Core Processor
    Motherboard
    Gigabyte B760M H DDR4 Micro ATX LGA1700 Motherboard
    Memory
    Corsair Vengeance LPX 64 GB (2 x 32 GB) DDR4-3200 CL16 Memory
    Graphics Card(s)
    Integrated Intel UHD Graphics 770
    Sound Card
    Realtek
    Monitor(s) Displays
    LG
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 990 Pro 1 TB M.2-2280 PCIe 4.0 X4 NVME Solid State Drive
    Samsung 990 Pro 2 TB M.2-2280 PCIe 4.0 X4 NVME Solid State Drive
    PSU
    NZXT 850w ATX 3.1 Gold Fully Modular Power Supply
    Case
    Thermaltake Versa H25 ATX Mid Tower Case
    Cooling
    CPU Cooler Thermalright Assassin Spirit 120 EVO ARGB (ARGB Disabled) - Case Fans BlackThermalright TL-C12C-S X3 66.17 CFM 120 mm Fans 3-Pack (ARGB disabled)
    Internet Speed
    1 Gbps
    Other Info
    I hate ARGB.
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Pro
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Lenovo ThinkBook 14 G2 ITL
Code:
mountvol S: /s
del S:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\SkuSiPolicy.p7b
mountvol S: /d
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
Code:
mountvol S: /s
del S:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\SkuSiPolicy.p7b
mountvol S: /d

I am sorry to ask because I know you have answered this a million times.

The major thing I can see is having to update it. Eventually you will probably stop with your script.
How does one make sure it's always updated?
 

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Me
    CPU
    Intel Core i5-12600K 3.7 GHz 10-Core Processor
    Motherboard
    Gigabyte B760M H DDR4 Micro ATX LGA1700 Motherboard
    Memory
    Corsair Vengeance LPX 64 GB (2 x 32 GB) DDR4-3200 CL16 Memory
    Graphics Card(s)
    Integrated Intel UHD Graphics 770
    Sound Card
    Realtek
    Monitor(s) Displays
    LG
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 990 Pro 1 TB M.2-2280 PCIe 4.0 X4 NVME Solid State Drive
    Samsung 990 Pro 2 TB M.2-2280 PCIe 4.0 X4 NVME Solid State Drive
    PSU
    NZXT 850w ATX 3.1 Gold Fully Modular Power Supply
    Case
    Thermaltake Versa H25 ATX Mid Tower Case
    Cooling
    CPU Cooler Thermalright Assassin Spirit 120 EVO ARGB (ARGB Disabled) - Case Fans BlackThermalright TL-C12C-S X3 66.17 CFM 120 mm Fans 3-Pack (ARGB disabled)
    Internet Speed
    1 Gbps
    Other Info
    I hate ARGB.
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Pro
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Lenovo ThinkBook 14 G2 ITL
The Secure Boot task can update SkuSiPolicy on the EFI (AvailableUpdates = 0x20), but I don't know if MS is forcing that behavior or not.

My update script will only update the EFI's copy if you already deployed one (using the '-SkuSiPolicy' option). If you have not chosen to use SkuSiPolicy, then it won't be copied. Typically the policy is changed when a new boot manager arrives (April 2026), which depends on how fast security holes are fixed.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
1 month to go! Still nothing here from microsoft or HP.
 

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Home 25H2
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    HP Pavilion 14-ce3606sa
    CPU
    Core i5-1035G1
    Memory
    32gb
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 870 evo sata ssd
    Cooling
    Could be better
    Internet Speed
    50 mbps Starlink
    Browser
    Firefox
    Other Info
    Originally came installed with a 500gb H10 Optane ssd
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Home
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    HP Pavilion ce3606sa
    CPU
    Intel Core i5-1035G1
    Memory
    16gb
    Hard Drives
    Hynix Gold P31 2TB
    Internet Speed
    200mbps Starlink
    Browser
    Firefox
    Antivirus
    Defender
After yesterdays 26200.8328 update I'm getting the Event log 1796 TPM WMI error again.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    HP
    CPU
    Gen 11 Core i5
    Memory
    16GB

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Home 25H2
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    HP Pavilion 14-ce3606sa
    CPU
    Core i5-1035G1
    Memory
    32gb
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 870 evo sata ssd
    Cooling
    Could be better
    Internet Speed
    50 mbps Starlink
    Browser
    Firefox
    Other Info
    Originally came installed with a 500gb H10 Optane ssd
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Home
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    HP Pavilion ce3606sa
    CPU
    Intel Core i5-1035G1
    Memory
    16gb
    Hard Drives
    Hynix Gold P31 2TB
    Internet Speed
    200mbps Starlink
    Browser
    Firefox
    Antivirus
    Defender
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