Updating Microsoft Secure Boot keys before expiration in June 2026



UPDATE 4/02:

UPDATE 2/10:


 Windows IT Pro Blog:

Secure Boot playbook for certificates expiring in 2026

The first set of tools and steps are now available to help you proactively update your Secure Boot certificates before they expire in June of 2026.

Secure Boot is more mature and robust today than it was some years ago. Coupled with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware signing process, Secure Boot uses cryptographic keys, known as certificate authorities (CAs), to validate that firmware modules come from a trusted source. This helps prevent malware from running early in the startup sequence of a Windows device.

Secure Boot certificates have always had expiration dates. New certificates help ensure that your devices stay up to date with the latest security protections. That is why your organization will need to install the 2023 CAs before the 2011 CAs start expiring in June of 2026.

Note: Need a refresher on why updating Secure Boot certificates is so important?
Many Windows PCs manufactured since 2024 already have the updated 2023 certificates. For the remaining devices, Microsoft is delivering new Secure Boot certificates through Windows monthly updates, with partner original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) making firmware updates available to help ensure compatibility.

If you wish to proactively update your Secure Boot certificates, this post contains initial steps you can take and tools you can use, with more scalable approaches coming soon. At a minimum, we encourage you to monitor the progress of your device fleet from the start.

Let’s get started. Here’s a summary of what you can do today to prepare:
  • Step 1: Inventory and prepare your environment
  • Step 2: Monitor and check your devices for Secure Boot status
  • Step 3: Apply OEM firmware updates before Microsoft updates
  • Step 4: Plan and pilot Secure Boot certificate deployments
  • Step 5: Troubleshoot and remediate common issues

Step 1: Inventory and prepare your environment​

For most devices in your organization, Microsoft will automatically update high-confidence devices via Windows Update. However, you can validate and actively roll out these updates, in which case, you would start by conducting an inventory.

Inventory

Most devices manufactured since 2012 have Secure Boot enabled, but you should always verify that. You should also check the status of the Secure Boot certificates with sample inventory PowerShell commands or by checking the value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key (it should ultimately be “updated”). Out of the devices that show up as not updated, build a small, representative sample. We recommend that you focus on the less common devices, for which high confidence determination isn’t automatic. Then follow the rest of the steps outlined in this post to pilot the certificate updates and help ensure that deployment is successful

Prepare select devices

To prepare devices for Secure Boot certificate deployment, consider how you’ll manage it. There are several approaches to managing Secure Boot certificate updates. Today, you can use registry keys or Group Policy. A Configuration Service Provider (CSP) for mobile device management (MDM), such as Microsoft Intune, is coming soon. Bookmark Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates - Microsoft Support for the latest updates.
  1. The primary method is to deploy the certificates to devices that have been validated as ready for the update. See Step 4 when you’re ready to deploy these updates!
  2. For the more common device configurations in your environment, you can utilize two “assists” to manage your deployment:
    • Get new certificates through monthly Windows updates for high-confidence devices. This option is enabled by default for devices that are ready for new certificates. Microsoft will update these devices for you unless you opt out. To opt out, set the HighConfidenceOptOut registry key<a href="Secure Boot playbook for certificates expiring in 2026 - Windows IT Pro Blog" target="_self" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer">ii</a> value to 1 or set the Automatic Certificate Deployment via Updates Group Policy to Disabled.
    • Opt devices in to Microsoft-managed controlled feature rollout. With registry keys, set the value of MicrosoftUpdateManagedOptIn to 1 to opt in to Microsoft-managed controlled feature rollout. The value of 0 or non-existent key means that you’re opted out. With Group Policy, configure the Certificate Deployment via Controlled Feature Rollout policy to Enabled. Note: To opt in, please configure devices to share required diagnostic data with Microsoft.
Important: All Secure Boot registry keys are under these two paths:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\Servicing


See Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates for more details.

Group Policy settings are available to you under the following path: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Secure Boot. To get the updates that include the Group Policy for deploying Secure Boot certificate updates, download the latest Administrative Templates (.admx) for Windows 11 and Windows Server.

Step 2: Monitor and check your devices for Secure Boot status​

Check the Secure Boot status of your devices before and after deployment. Soon, you will be able to use your preferred management and reporting tools. For now, you can use registry keys or Windows Event Log events to identify which devices already have new certificates and which ones need attention.

Deployment progress

The text value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key will indicate if your certificate deployment status is not started, in progress, or updated. The value will change progressively until all new certificates and the new boot manager have been deployed successfully.

Successful deployment
  • Audit the Windows System Event Log events for Event ID 1808. This informational event indicates that the device has the required new Secure Boot certificates applied to the device’s firmware.
  • Audit the UEFICA2023Error registry key for issues. This key should not exist unless an error is pending.
  • Check that the text value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key reads as “Updated.”
Errors during deployment
  • Audit the Windows System Event Log for Event ID 1801.This error event indicates that the updated certificates have not been applied to the device. Analyze details specific to the device, including device attributes, that will help you in correlating which devices still need updating.
  • Check if the UEFICA2023Error registry key exists. If so, it indicates an error in certificate deployment. The error itself won’t appear in the Event Log. Trace related issues through Secure Boot DB and DBX variable update events.

Step 3: Apply OEM firmware updates before Microsoft updates​

Updated firmware can help prevent compatibility problems and ensure new Secure Boot certificates are accepted. If your organization has identified Secure Boot update issues or your OEM recommends a firmware update, apply the latest BIOS/UEFI update before installing Secure Boot–related Windows updates.

Some OEMs provide firmware updates that include important fixes and updated certificate stores. These updates help Secure Boot function correctly with new Windows certificates. Microsoft works closely with OEM partners to ensure these updates integrate smoothly with Windows.

Step 4: Plan and pilot Secure Boot certificate deployments​

As you’ve seen in Step 1, Microsoft can assist with your Secure Boot updates if you enable diagnostic data.

You can also deploy new Secure Boot certificates yourself for devices that don’t already have them. Choose a way to do this with registry keys, via Windows Configuration System (WinCS) command-line interface (CLI), or using Group Policy today. Pilot your desired method first on a representative set of devices to gain confidence.

In a typical enterprise deployment, whatever option you choose, allow approximately 48 hours and one or more restarts after changing configuration for updates to fully apply. See How updates are deployed for more details. For testing scenarios, you can accelerate the experience by following the steps outlined in Device Testing Using Registry Keys.

Important: Avoid mixing deployment methods on the same device. For additional technical recommendations to help you plan and deploy your Secure Boot updates, see Deployment strategies.

Option 1: Deploy certificates with registry keys​

Find the AvailableUpdates registry key located under this registry path:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot

Set its value to 0x5944 to deploy all needed certificates and update to the Windows UEFI CA 2023 signed boot manager. This key corresponds to the Group Policy setting Enable Secure Boot certificate deployment. For details, see Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates.

Option 2: Deploy certificates via Windows Configuration System (WinCS)​

New command-line tools are now available for domain-joined clients on Windows 11, versions 25H2, 24H2, and 23H2.

These include both a traditional executable and a PowerShell module to query and apply Secure Boot configurations locally to a device. For step-by-step guidance, see Windows Configuration System (WinCS) APIs for Secure Boot.

Deploy the Secure Boot updates via WinCS:
  • Feature name: Feature_AllKeysAndBootMgrByWinCS
  • WinCS key value: F33E0C8E002
  • Secure Boot configuration state: Enabled

Option 3: Deploy certificates using Group Policy​

Group Policy settings are available by navigating to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Secure Boot.

To apply Secure Boot updates to devices using Group Policy, set the Enable Secure Boot certificate deployment policy to Enabled. This lets Windows automatically begin the certificate deployment process. This setting corresponds to the registry key AvailableUpdates.

Be sure to get the latest version of the .admx for Windows 11 and Windows Server. For more details, see Group Policy Objects (GPO) method of Secure Boot for Windows devices with IT-managed updates.

Option 4: Deploy certificates using mobile device management (coming soon)​

Soon, you’ll be able to manage Secure Boot updates using MDM solutions, such as Microsoft Intune. When this method is available, we will post updated guidance at Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates - Microsoft Support.

Step 5. Troubleshoot and remediate common issues​

You can also use registry keys and Windows Event Log events to identify and resolve common issues:
  • The UEFICA2023Error registry key doesn’t exist if there are no errors. If it exists with a value other than 0, check your remediation recommendations in Secure Boot DB and DBX variable update events.
  • The AvailableUpdates registry key on a device is set to 0x4104. If it doesn’t clear the 0x0004 bit even after multiple restarts, the device doesn’t progress past deploying the new Key Exchange Key (KEK) certificate. If you encounter this error, check with your OEM to confirm they have followed the steps outlined in Windows Secure Boot Key Creation and Management Guidance.
  • If Event Viewer Windows Logs for System registers an Event ID 1795, it means that there was an error when Windows attempted to hand off the certificates to firmware. Check with the OEM to see if there is a firmware update available for the device to resolve this issue.

Your update strategy begins today​

Today, you can start preparing, monitoring, deploying, and troubleshooting Secure Boot certificates in advance of the June 2026 expiration date. The new registry keys, WinCS, Group Policy, and Windows Log tools are here to support you and are just the beginning. More tools for additional scenarios are in development.

For the latest information, bookmark Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates. Looking for a specific topic?

 Source:





 Windows IT Pro Blog:

Updating Microsoft Secure Boot keys​

Microsoft, in collaboration with our ecosystem partners, is preparing to roll out replacement certificates that’ll set new Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Certificate Authorities (CAs) trust anchors in Secure Boot for the future. Look out for Secure Boot database updates rolling out in phases to add trust for the new database (DB) and Key Exchange Key (KEK) certificates. This new DB update is available as an optional servicing update for all Secure Boot enabled devices from February 13, 2024.

What is Secure Boot?​

Secure Boot is a security feature in the UEFI that helps ensure that only trusted software runs during the system’s boot sequence. It works by verifying the digital signature of any software against a set of trusted digital keys stored in the UEFI. As an industry standard, UEFI’s Secure Boot defines how platform firmware manages certificates, authenticates firmware, and how the operating system (OS) interfaces with this process. For more details on UEFI and Secure Boot, please refer to this article.

Secure Boot was first introduced to Windows systems with the Windows 8 release to protect against the emerging pre-boot malware (bootkit) threat at that time. Since then, Secure Boot has continued to be a part of Microsoft's Trusted Boot security architecture. Secure Boot authenticates modules such as UEFI firmware drivers, bootloaders, applications, and option ROMs (Read-Only Memory), which are firmware run by the PC BIOS during platform initialization, before they are all executed. As the final step of the Secure Boot process, the firmware verifies the Windows boot loader is trusted by Secure Boot and then passes control to the boot loader which in turn verifies, loads into memory, and launches Windows. This process coupled with the UEFI firmware signing process helps to ensure that only verified code executes before Windows, preventing attackers from utilizing the boot path as an attack vector. To learn more about how Secure Boot fits in with the overall Windows chip-t-cloud security, please refer to the Windows Security Book RWMyFE.

Trust and authenticity in Secure Boot are built using the Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). This establishes a certificate management system which utilizes CAs to store digital certificates. These CAs, consisting of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or their delegates and Microsoft, generate key pairs that form the root of trust of a system.

bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA0OWlGOEI2MDY4MzMyRDJDNzBC


Secure Boot “root of trust”: Setting trust anchors for the future​

Secure Boot’s root of trust utilizes a hierarchical system, where the Platform Key (PK) is typically managed by the OEM and used to sign updates to the KEK database. The KEK in turn signs updates to both the Allowed Signature DB and the Forbidden Signature Database (DBX).

The Secure Boot Allowed Signature DB and the DBX are integral to the functionality of Secure Boot. Bootloader modules’ signing authority must be allowlisted by the Secure Boot DB, while the DBX is used for revoking previously trusted boot components. Updates to the DB and DBX must be signed by a KEK in the Secure Boot KEK database.

The configuration of Secure Boot DB and KEK for Windows devices has remained the same since Windows 8. Microsoft requires every OEM to include the same three certificates managed by Microsoft for Windows and in support of the third-party hardware and OS ecosystem. These include the Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 stored in the KEK database, and two certificates stored in the DB called the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, which signs the Windows bootloader, and the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (or third-party UEFI CA), which signs third-party OS and hardware driver components.

All three of these Microsoft certificates expire in 2026. So, in collaboration with our ecosystem partners, Microsoft is preparing to roll out replacement certificates that will set new UEFI CA trust anchors for the future. Microsoft will be rolling out Secure Boot database updates in phases to add trust for the new DB and KEK certificates. The first DB update will add the Microsoft Windows UEFI CA 2023 to the system DB. The new Microsoft Windows UEFI CA 2023 will be used to sign Windows boot components prior to the expiration of the Windows Production CA 2011. This DB update will be optional for the February 2024 servicing and preview updates, and can be manually applied to devices. Microsoft will slowly roll out this DB update as we validate devices and firmware compatibility globally. The full DB update’s controlled-rollout process to all Windows customers will begin during the 2024 April servicing and preview updates, ahead of the certificate expiration in 2026. Meanwhile, efforts to update the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (aka third-party UEFI CA) and Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 will begin late 2024, and will follow a similar controlled rollout process as this DB update.

While Microsoft has frequently performed DBX updates globally since the inception of Secure Boot, this will be the first DB update performed on such a large scale. We’re actively collaborating with our OEM partners to identify and address bugs in firmware implementation that could result in unbootable systems or render a device unreceptive to the DB update. To ensure a successful rollout, devices with identified issues will be suspended from receiving the update until a fix is released.

Microsoft is taking a very deliberate and cautious approach to rolling out this update. With this DB update, Microsoft will sustain its ability to service all Windows devices’ boot components.

Guidance to manually apply DB update​

The DB update is available on February 13, 2024, along with manual steps to allow customers to test for firmware compatibility, especially for organizations with fleets of devices. If you would like to manually apply the DB update to validate that your system is compatible, please read the following instructions. These actions should be completed with non-critical hardware representing devices in your environment.

Pre-requisite checks​

Before attempting the DB update, please ensure to perform the necessary pre-requisite checks:
  1. If you intend to manually apply this update to a large group of devices, we advise that you begin by rolling out to individual devices with the same firmware and specifications first to minimize the risks in the case of firmware bugs in your devices.
  2. Please verify that your UEFI firmware version is the most recent available version by your firmware vendor or OEM.
  3. For data backup steps, please refer to this guide.
  4. If you use BitLocker or if your enterprise has deployed BitLocker on your machine, ensure to backup BitLocker Keys:


    A) See this portal to ensure your BitLocker keys are backed up before your next reboot for your selfhost device. In the unlikely event that device becomes inoperable after receiving the update, the hard drive can still be unlocked.

    B) If the keys are backed up, the UI should resemble the following:

    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1MGk5NzY0QzRENjdBQkYwRkE2


    C) If the keys are not backed up, please open Windows Search to search for “Manage BitLocker” and select Back up your recovery key followed by Save to your Azure AD or MSA account.

    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1MWlEQkZDQTZDNDBDOEQwNzMy


    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1Mmk5QjE2MDRBRTAyMUE1MDQ5


    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1M2k2MzgxMUE1NEQ5NjEzREE4
For users that use a local account instead of an Azure Active Directory (AAD) or Microsoft account (MSA), you can print your recovery password, save to a file, and store it in a secure location.


 Formal DB update steps

  1. Apply the February 2024 (or later) security update.
  2. Open a PowerShell console and ensure that PowerShell is running as an administrator before running the following commands:
    1. Set the registry key to:

      Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot" -Name "AvailableUpdates" -Value 0x40
    2. Run the following scheduled task as:

      Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName "\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update"
  3. Reboot the machine twice after running these commands to confirm that the machine is booting with the updated DB.
  4. To verify that the Secure Boot DB update was successful, open a PowerShell console and ensure that PowerShell is running as an administrator before running the following command:

    [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI db).bytes) -match ‘Windows UEFI CA 2023’

    bS00MDU1MzI0LTU1MTA1NGlGNjJBRDlDRTNCRDJCQTIw
If the command returns “True”, the update was successful. In the case of errors while applying the DB update, please refer to the article, KB5016061: Addressing vulnerable and revoked Boot Managers.


 Source:


See also:
 
Last edited:
If you don't have Secure Boot enabled, none of this Secure Boot update process will matter. You'll get the repeated TPM-WMI messages in your event log, and eventually Windows will have a pop nag to remind it's better to have a working Secure Boot... otherwise Windows will run fine.

Reset factory keys is your best option for the moment. Just so Windows doesn't throw more warning messages. If the scripts can't read your UEFI, neither can Windows. Some legacy BIOS'es might be unfixable due to having old firmware.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
Just note with a gigabyte m/b esp. 4xx 5xx series, when it shows SB enabled in BIOS but not active and shows setup mode, take care with reset keys or similar BIOS options - there have been plenty of cases of bricked m/b that mention having done this. I suspect it maybe happens when users disable CSM (many older W10 installs were MBR not GPT) at the same time as changing SB settings.

Assuming CSM is already disabled - for UEFI boot - then it's prob OK - but to be safe I still follow the steps of - toggle standard to custom and then back to standard accepting factory defaults - which switches to user mode and allows SB to be actually enabled
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11
SVN security protection:
"The Boot Manager deployed in Step 2 has a new self-revocation feature built-in. When the Boot Manager starts to run, it performs a self-check by comparing the Secure Version Number (SVN) that is stored in the firmware, with the SVN built into the Boot Manager. If the Boot Manager SVN is lower than the SVN stored in the firmware, the Boot Manager will refuse to run. This feature prevents an attacker from rolling back the Boot Manager to an older, non-updated version.

In future updates, when a significant security issue is fixed in the Boot Manager, the SVN number will be incremented in both the Boot Manager and the update to the firmware. Both updates will be released in the same cumulative update to make sure that patched devices are protected. Each time the SVN is updated, any bootable media will need to be updated.

Starting with the July 9, 2024, updates, the SVN is being incremented in the Boot Manager and the update to the firmware. The firmware update is optional and can be applied by following these steps:


Based on your screenshot, almost everything looks good. The last three red lines indicate that the SVN update hasn't been applied. You can wait.
The first red line above the three SVN lines should be green. On my desktop, which has the BIOS with the 2023 certificates, Microsoft automatically applied the DBX (I don't really know what that is). Like you, I haven't manually configured anything on this computer. It's possible that because you have Secure Boot disabled, the red line above the SVN lines isn't up to date.

In the script folder (Method 1), there's a script to update the DBX. Run "Apply DBX update (restart required).reg" as administrator and reboot. Wait 30 to 60 minutes and then check again with the same script from Method 1.
So if I leave it MS will add the 15 missing SVN keys at some point?
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 (RP channel)
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    MSI
    CPU
    AMD Ryzen 7 9800X3D 8-core
    Motherboard
    MEG X870E Godlike
    Memory
    64GB Corsair Titanium 6000/CL30
    Graphics Card(s)
    MSI Suprim 5080 SOC
    Sound Card
    Soundblaster AE-9
    Monitor(s) Displays
    ASUS TUF Gaming VG289Q
    Screen Resolution
    3840x2160
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 9100 Pro 4TB (gen 5 x4, system drive/games)
    Samsung 990 Pro 2TB
    Samsung 980 Pro 2TB
    Samsung 870 Evo 4TB
    Samsung 870 Evo 2TB
    Samsung T9 4TB
    PSU
    Seasonic PX-2200
    Case
    Bequiet! Dark Base Pro 901
    Cooling
    Noctua NH-D15S Chromax black
    Keyboard
    Logitech G915 X (wired)
    Mouse
    Logitech G903 with PowerPlay charger
    Internet Speed
    900Mb/sec
    Browser
    Microsoft Edge
    Antivirus
    Windows Defender
So if I leave it MS will add the 15 missing SVN keys at some point?
There are three assigned SVN numbers.
One for Windows boot manager, one for booting from physical CD/DVDs, and one for network boot.

You only care about the Windows boot manager's SVN. The other two are irrelevant for almost all users.

A DBX update file can contain zero, or up to 3 SVN's in the file. When the SVN's are applied to the DBX, the highest SVN within each category (BootMgr, CD, or WDS) wins out. Previous SVN's of a lower number never disappear from the DBX, they hang around forever.

If a boot file needs to be revoked (for a security problem), MS will release a new boot file and increment the SVN's at the same time. The three SVN's don't have to match.

DBX update fileBootMgr SVNCD SVNWDS SVN
DBXUpdate2024.bin2.02.02.0
DBXUpdateSVN.bin7.03.03.0

There's not 15 of them, if you applied all the revocation files to date.
 
Last edited:

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
There are three assigned SVN numbers.
One for Windows boot manager, one for booting from physical CD/DVDs, and one for network boot.

You only care about the Windows boot manager's SVN. The other two are irrelevant for almost all users.

A DBX update file can contain zero, or up to 3 SVN's in the file. When the SVN's are applied to the DBX, the highest SVN within each category (BootMgr, CD, or WDS) wins out. Previous SVN's of a lower number never disappear from the DBX, they hang around forever.

If a boot file needs to be revoked (for a security problem), MS will release a new boot file and increment the SVN's at the same time. The three SVN's don't have to match.

DBX update fileBootMgr SVNCD SVNWDS SVN
DBXUpdate2024.bin2.02.02.0
DBXUpdateSVN.bin7.03.03.0

There's not 15 of them, if you applied all the revocation files to date.
OK so if I leave the SVN it will get updated by MS? Or if I run the DBX update script it will fix it manually?
Just want to confirm
I don't need Secure boot but obviously if I ever do it needs to work!
 

Attachments

  • Screenshot 2026-02-15 072302.webp
    Screenshot 2026-02-15 072302.webp
    59.7 KB · Views: 3

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 (RP channel)
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    MSI
    CPU
    AMD Ryzen 7 9800X3D 8-core
    Motherboard
    MEG X870E Godlike
    Memory
    64GB Corsair Titanium 6000/CL30
    Graphics Card(s)
    MSI Suprim 5080 SOC
    Sound Card
    Soundblaster AE-9
    Monitor(s) Displays
    ASUS TUF Gaming VG289Q
    Screen Resolution
    3840x2160
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 9100 Pro 4TB (gen 5 x4, system drive/games)
    Samsung 990 Pro 2TB
    Samsung 980 Pro 2TB
    Samsung 870 Evo 4TB
    Samsung 870 Evo 2TB
    Samsung T9 4TB
    PSU
    Seasonic PX-2200
    Case
    Bequiet! Dark Base Pro 901
    Cooling
    Noctua NH-D15S Chromax black
    Keyboard
    Logitech G915 X (wired)
    Mouse
    Logitech G903 with PowerPlay charger
    Internet Speed
    900Mb/sec
    Browser
    Microsoft Edge
    Antivirus
    Windows Defender
OK so if I leave the SVN it will get updated by MS? Or if I run the DBX update script it will fix it manually?
When the mandatory CA 2011 revocation happens, Windows will roll out the SVN's at the same time.

If you don't want to wait, you have two options for completing the full revocation:
1. Set AvailableUpdates=0x282, and run the scheduled task

2. Run my update script as "Update_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 -Revoke"
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
When the mandatory CA 2011 revocation happens, Windows will roll out the SVN's at the same time.

If you don't want to wait, you have two options for completing the full revocation:
1. Set AvailableUpdates=0x282, and run the scheduled task

2. Run my update script as "Update_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 -Revoke"
OK thanks for confirming. I can wait. I don't need SB anyway and hopefully never will!
The posts I've seen on here with the green SVN check (431) - I guess they've all done the full revocations manually?
Think that's where I'm getting confused
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 (RP channel)
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    MSI
    CPU
    AMD Ryzen 7 9800X3D 8-core
    Motherboard
    MEG X870E Godlike
    Memory
    64GB Corsair Titanium 6000/CL30
    Graphics Card(s)
    MSI Suprim 5080 SOC
    Sound Card
    Soundblaster AE-9
    Monitor(s) Displays
    ASUS TUF Gaming VG289Q
    Screen Resolution
    3840x2160
    Hard Drives
    Samsung 9100 Pro 4TB (gen 5 x4, system drive/games)
    Samsung 990 Pro 2TB
    Samsung 980 Pro 2TB
    Samsung 870 Evo 4TB
    Samsung 870 Evo 2TB
    Samsung T9 4TB
    PSU
    Seasonic PX-2200
    Case
    Bequiet! Dark Base Pro 901
    Cooling
    Noctua NH-D15S Chromax black
    Keyboard
    Logitech G915 X (wired)
    Mouse
    Logitech G903 with PowerPlay charger
    Internet Speed
    900Mb/sec
    Browser
    Microsoft Edge
    Antivirus
    Windows Defender
There are 3 different files to apply:

dbxupdate.bin: List of banned EFI boot files, written as signature hashes to save space. Current count is 431.
DBXupdate2024.bin: Bans PCA 2011, and sets SVN = 2.0
DBXupdateSVN.bin: Raises BootMgr SVN = 7.0

If you have at least 431 DBX signatures, you’re good. You may own more because legacy BIOS’es can include older EFI signatures from the factory (non duplicates).

If you have PCA 2011 in DBX, you’re good.

If you have BootMgr SVN = 7.0, you’re good.

Meeting all 3 requirements means you finished revoking everything.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro for Workstations
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Custom self build
    CPU
    Intel i7-8700K 5 GHz
    Motherboard
    ASUS ROG Maximus XI Formula Z390
    Memory
    64 GB (4x16GB) G.SKILL TridentZ RGB DDR4 3600 MHz (F4-3600C18D-32GTZR)
    Graphics Card(s)
    ASUS ROG-STRIX-GTX1080TI-O11G-GAMING (11GB GDDR5X)
    Sound Card
    Integrated Digital Audio (S/PDIF)
    Monitor(s) Displays
    2 x Samsung Odyssey G75 27"
    Screen Resolution
    2560x1440
    Hard Drives
    1TB Samsung 990 PRO M.2,
    4TB Samsung 990 PRO M.2,
    TerraMaster F8 SSD Plus NAS
    PSU
    Seasonic Prime Titanium 850W
    Case
    Thermaltake Core P3 wall mounted
    Cooling
    Corsair Hydro H115i
    Keyboard
    Amazon Basics Wired Full Keyboard MD005
    Mouse
    Logitech MX Master 4
    Internet Speed
    2 Gbps Download and 100 Mbps Upload
    Browser
    Chrome and Edge
    Antivirus
    Microsoft Defender
    Other Info
    Logitech Z625 speaker system,
    Logitech BRIO 4K Pro webcam,
    HP Color LaserJet Pro MFP M477fdn,
    CyberPower CP1500PFCLCD
    Galaxy S23 Plus phone
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Pro
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Surface Laptop 7 Copilot+ PC
    CPU
    Snapdragon X Elite (12 core) 3.42 GHz
    Memory
    16 GB LPDDR5x-7467 MHz
    Monitor(s) Displays
    15" HDR
    Screen Resolution
    2496 x 1664
    Hard Drives
    1 TB SSD
    Internet Speed
    Wi-Fi 7 and Bluetooth 5.4
    Browser
    Chrome and Edge
    Antivirus
    Microsoft Defender
This appears to be a re-write of the existing Secure Boot guidance (to date), except in a cleanly formatted article.

There's nothing new, except to note if you get errors, please check your HW vendor.
  • The AvailableUpdates registry key on a device is set to 0x4104. If it doesn't clear the 0x0004 bit even after multiple restarts, the device doesn't progress past deploying the new Key Exchange Key (KEK) certificate. You will likely see an Event ID 1803 which says “A PK-signed Key Exchange Key (KEK) cannot be found for this device. Check with the device manufacturer for proper key provisioning.” If you encounter this error, check with your device manufacturer or virtual platform provider to confirm their support policy.

  • If Event Viewer Windows Logs for System registers an Event ID 1795, it means that there was an error when Windows attempted to hand off the certificates to firmware. Check with your device manufacturer or platform provider to see if there is a firmware update available for the device to resolve this issue.

Translation: MS leaves it up to your device manufacturer to tell you they won't support an outdated PC or server.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
I am having an issue with my Lenovo ThinkStation P360 Ultra. I updated my BIOS to the latest version. This update was supposed to include the new certificate info. I went into BIOS and did a "Restore Keys" which is what Lenovo suggests. However when I run the PS command to check if the certificate has been updated, I get "False". If I run the command "[System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI db).bytes)" to list everything in the DB and search the result, I get two entries that contain "UEFI CA 2023":

1. "Microsoft UEFI CA 2023"
2. "Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023"

There is no "Windows UEFI CA 2023". Is there a problem with that BIOS release? I ran the same BIOS update and "Restore Keys" process for a Lenovo ThinkCenter and that worked fine.

JohnD
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 10
I am having an issue with my Lenovo ThinkStation P360 Ultra. I updated my BIOS to the latest version. This update was supposed to include the new certificate info. I went into BIOS and did a "Restore Keys" which is what Lenovo suggests. However when I run the PS command to check if the certificate has been updated, I get "False". If I run the command "[System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI db).bytes)" to list everything in the DB and search the result, I get two entries that contain "UEFI CA 2023":

1. "Microsoft UEFI CA 2023"
2. "Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023"

There is no "Windows UEFI CA 2023". Is there a problem with that BIOS release? I ran the same BIOS update and "Restore Keys" process for a Lenovo ThinkCenter and that worked fine.

JohnD

Have you tried Garlins scripts?

 

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 Build 26200.8524
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Sin-built 2013
    CPU
    Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4770K CPU @ 3.50GHz
    Motherboard
    ASUS ROG Maximus VI Formula
    Memory
    32.0 GB of I forget and the box is in storage.
    Graphics Card(s)
    Gigabyte nVidia GeForce GTX 1660 Super OC 6GB
    Sound Card
    Onboard thingy
    Monitor(s) Displays
    5 x LG 25MS500-B - 1 x 24MK430H-B - 1 x Wacom Pro 22" Touch Screen Tablet
    Screen Resolution
    All over the place
    Hard Drives
    Too many to list.
    OS on Samsung 1TB 870 QVO SATA
    PSU
    Silverstone 1500
    Case
    NZXT Phantom 820 Full-Tower Case
    Cooling
    Noctua NH-D15 Elite Class Dual Tower CPU Cooler / 6 x EziDIY 120mm / 2 x Corsair 140mm somethings / 1 x 140mm Thermaltake something / 2 x 200mm Corsair.
    Keyboard
    Corsair K95 / Logitech diNovo Edge Wireless
    Mouse
    Logitech: G402 / G502 / Mx Masters / Mx Air Cordless
    Internet Speed
    2000/500Mbps
    Browser
    All sorts
    Antivirus
    Kaspersky Premium
    Other Info
    ㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀
    TP-Link BE9300 WiFi 7 Bluetooth 5.4 (Archer TBE550E)
    TP-Link TX201 V1 2.5GB Lan

    Grandstream HT812 - VoIP
    ASUS DSL-AX82U - Mesh
    ASUS RT-AC68U - Mesh
    ASUS RT-BE88U Router

    Brother MFC-L2880DW Printer

    I’m on a horse.
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 Build 26200.8524
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    LENOVO Yoga 7 14IRL8 - 7i EVO OLED 14" Touchscreen i5 12 Core 16GB/512GB
    CPU
    Intel Core 12th Gen i5-1240P Processor (1.7 - 4.4GHz)
    Memory
    16GB LPDDR5 RAM
    Graphics card(s)
    Intel Iris Xe Graphics Processor
    Sound Card
    Optimized with Dolby Atmos®
    Screen Resolution
    QHD 2880 x 1800 OLED
    Hard Drives
    M.2 512GB
    Antivirus
    Defender / Malwarebytes
    Other Info
    …still on a horse.
If you installed the latest BIOS release, it should include the UEFI certs:
Code:
Version 1.56

[Important updates]
 - (New) Regular BIOS update.
 - (New) Add Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 cetificate.
 - (New) Upgrade Absolute to 2.8.2.4.
 - (New) Remove Subscription Certificate Storage Feature.

We need to check if the BIOS update installed the KEK CA 2023 cert for your PC. After that is in place, all the other CA 2023 certs can be copied over even if the BIOS update didn't populate the complete set of certs.

You can download the ZIP file from the thread (shared above), and run as Administrator:
Code:
powershell -ep bypass -f \your\folders\path\Check_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 -Verbose

Replace the "\your\folders\path" with the location of where you extracted the script to.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
I compared what is in my ThinkStation with what is in theThinkCenter computer I also updated via BIOS. The Thinkcenter, which worked, shows “Microsoft Corporation Windows UEFI CA 2023” in a list of the SecureBoot DB data. My ThinkStation shows “Microsoft UEFI CA 2023”. Therefore they butchered the BIOS update.

JohnD
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 10

My Computers

System One System Two

  • OS
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 Build 26200.8524
    Computer type
    PC/Desktop
    Manufacturer/Model
    Sin-built 2013
    CPU
    Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4770K CPU @ 3.50GHz
    Motherboard
    ASUS ROG Maximus VI Formula
    Memory
    32.0 GB of I forget and the box is in storage.
    Graphics Card(s)
    Gigabyte nVidia GeForce GTX 1660 Super OC 6GB
    Sound Card
    Onboard thingy
    Monitor(s) Displays
    5 x LG 25MS500-B - 1 x 24MK430H-B - 1 x Wacom Pro 22" Touch Screen Tablet
    Screen Resolution
    All over the place
    Hard Drives
    Too many to list.
    OS on Samsung 1TB 870 QVO SATA
    PSU
    Silverstone 1500
    Case
    NZXT Phantom 820 Full-Tower Case
    Cooling
    Noctua NH-D15 Elite Class Dual Tower CPU Cooler / 6 x EziDIY 120mm / 2 x Corsair 140mm somethings / 1 x 140mm Thermaltake something / 2 x 200mm Corsair.
    Keyboard
    Corsair K95 / Logitech diNovo Edge Wireless
    Mouse
    Logitech: G402 / G502 / Mx Masters / Mx Air Cordless
    Internet Speed
    2000/500Mbps
    Browser
    All sorts
    Antivirus
    Kaspersky Premium
    Other Info
    ㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀
    TP-Link BE9300 WiFi 7 Bluetooth 5.4 (Archer TBE550E)
    TP-Link TX201 V1 2.5GB Lan

    Grandstream HT812 - VoIP
    ASUS DSL-AX82U - Mesh
    ASUS RT-AC68U - Mesh
    ASUS RT-BE88U Router

    Brother MFC-L2880DW Printer

    I’m on a horse.
  • Operating System
    Windows 11 Pro 25H2 Build 26200.8524
    Computer type
    Laptop
    Manufacturer/Model
    LENOVO Yoga 7 14IRL8 - 7i EVO OLED 14" Touchscreen i5 12 Core 16GB/512GB
    CPU
    Intel Core 12th Gen i5-1240P Processor (1.7 - 4.4GHz)
    Memory
    16GB LPDDR5 RAM
    Graphics card(s)
    Intel Iris Xe Graphics Processor
    Sound Card
    Optimized with Dolby Atmos®
    Screen Resolution
    QHD 2880 x 1800 OLED
    Hard Drives
    M.2 512GB
    Antivirus
    Defender / Malwarebytes
    Other Info
    …still on a horse.
There's two different UEFI CA 2023 keys for DB:
- Windows UEFI is obviously used by Windows​
- Microsoft UEFI is for Linux and non-Windows OS'es​

If the BIOS or update process was correctly done, you should see both certs (even though you only need one for Windows). Running the script will give a more complete picture of what happened.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
Here is the Check UEFI data:

*************************************************************************
Secure Boot: ON
Virtualization Based Security: ON
BitLocker on (C:) OFF

UEFI KEK Certs
--------------
Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011
Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023

UEFI DB Certs
-------------
Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011
Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023
Microsoft UEFI CA 2023

UEFI DBX Certs
--------------
(NONE)

EFI Files
---------
Disk 1: Windows Boot Manager [Production PCA 2011] is ALLOWED.

Registry: WindowsUEFICA2023Capable = 0
[Windows UEFI CA 2023] not in UEFI DB.

Disk 1: SkuSiPolicy.p7b (for VBS) is NOT PRESENT.
*************************************************************************

As you can see the "Windows UEFI CA 2023" entry is missing. It is instead coded as "Microsoft UEFI CA 2023".

JohnD
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 10
UEFI DB Certs
-------------
Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011
Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023
Microsoft UEFI CA 2023
As you can see the "Windows UEFI CA 2023" entry is missing. It is instead coded as "Microsoft UEFI CA 2023".
Windows UEFI CA 2023 is missing, but it's a separate cert from MS UEFI CA 2023.

You should run these commands as Administrator:
Code:
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Secureboot /v AvailableUpdates /t REG_DWORD /d 0x40 /f
powershell Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName "\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update"

Afterwards, re-run the check script and confirm you have (5) DB Certs.
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7
I have reported this to Lenovo. They are passing it on to their "BIOS team". Hopefully they will fix it and release an updated BIOS.

I also updated my Lenovo ThinkPad which is about 5 years old. They had a BIOS update for it. I ran that and went through the process of restoring the keys. The BIOS for that machine is a little difficult to traverse. When I got to the allow "Restore" screen, "NO" was highlighted and I could not change that. After playing with it I eventually was able to get it to restore the keys. The only problem is that the "WindowsUEFICA2023Capable" entry was set to "1" not "2". So what does this mean?

JohnD
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 10
1 = Windows UEFI CA 2023 cert is installed in DB.
2 -> Requires installing the newer boot manager (after reaching 1).

Code:
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Secureboot /v AvailableUpdates /t REG_DWORD /d 0x100
powershell Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName "\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update"
 

My Computer

System One

  • OS
    Windows 7

Latest Support Threads

Back
Top Bottom